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Abstract
Purpose – A key cybernetics concept, information transmitted in a system, was quantified by
Shannon. It quickly gained prominence, inspiring a version by Harvard psychologists Garner and
Hake for “absolute identification” experiments. There, human subjects “categorize” sensory stimuli,
affording “information transmitted” in perception. The Garner-Hake formulation has been in
continuous use for 62 years, exerting enormous influence. But some experienced theorists and
reviewers have criticized it as uninformative. They could not explain why, and were ignored. Here, the
“why” is answered. The paper aims to discuss these issues.
Design/methodology/approach – A key Shannon data-organizing tool is the confusion matrix.
Its columns and rows are, respectively, labeled by “symbol sent” (event) and “symbol received” (outcome),
such that matrix entries represent how often outcomes actually corresponded to events. Garner and Hake
made their own version of the matrix, which deserves scrutiny, and is minutely examined here.
Findings – The Garner-Hake confusion-matrix columns represent “stimulus categories”, ranges of
some physical stimulus attribute (usually intensity), and its rows represent “response categories” of
the subject’s identification of the attribute. The matrix entries thus show how often an identification
empirically corresponds to an intensity, such that “outcomes” and “events” differ in kind (unlike
Shannon’s). Obtaining a true “information transmitted” therefore requires stimulus categorizations to
be converted to hypothetical evoking stimuli, achievable (in principle) by relating categorization to
sensation to intensity. But those relations are actually unknown, perhaps unknowable.
Originality/value – The author achieves an important understanding: why “absolute identification”
experiments do not illuminate sensory processes.
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1. Introduction
Shannon (1948) derived the calculation of “information transmitted”. It was reformulated
by Garner and Hake (1951) for sensory psychology “absolute identification” experiments.
What emerged was the “channel capacity”, sensationalized as a fundamental cognitive
capability in “The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity
for processing information” (Miller, 1956). Garner and Hake (1951) and Miller (1956) were
remarkably influential (Nizami, 2010), and “channel capacity” calculations continue to
this day (Lee et al., 2012). But theorists (Luce, 2003; Laming, cited therein) and reviewers
(Gregory, 1980; Collins, 2007) have declared the effort fruitless, although lacking
confidence regarding why. The present paper answers “why”. It does not, however, aim
to add clarity to those earlier criticisms; they had missed the points to be revealed here,
as any interested reader can confirm, and their details are beyond present scope.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0368-492X.htm
The Editors, Drs Ranulph Glanville and Dai Griffiths, and the two anonymous reviewers
contributed many insights, as did Prof. Claire S. Barnes PhD (VA Palo Alto HCS).
Received 30 September 2012
Revised 18 February 2013
Accepted 7 October 2013
Kybernetes
Vol. 42 No. 9/10, 2013
pp. 1447-1456
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0368-492X
DOI 10.1108/K-09-2012-0059
Paradigm versus
praxis
1447
2. The “general communication system”, its information transmitted, and
the “confusion matrix”
Shannon (1948) proposed a model “general communication system”. Figure 1 shows
that system, which, to Shannon, consists of:
. “an information source which produces a message or sequence of messages to be
communicated to the receiving terminal”;
. “a transmitter which operates on the message in some way to produce a signal
suitable for transmission over the channel”;
. “the channel is merely the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter
to receiver”;
. “the receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation of that done by the
transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal”; and
. “the destination is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended”.
To Shannon, n “events” are possible. The one that occurs is the “outcome”, which is
uncertain when n . 1. But if each event’s probability of occurrence, pi (i ¼ 1, . . . , n) is
known, then the “source information”, called IS, is:
source information ðsource uncertaintyÞ ¼ 2K
Xn
i¼1
pi log pi; K . 0; ð1Þ
where
Xn
i¼1
pi ¼ 1:
The base of the logarithms is a positive integer; 2 is used most often. Shannon set
K ¼ 1. When symbols “k” are the events:
IS ¼ 2
k
X
pðkÞ log pðkÞ: ð2Þ
A symbol received is presumably from the set of symbols sent. But not all symbols are
received as sent; unintended changes occur, i.e. “noisiness”. Information transmitted,
denoted It, can be calculated knowing:
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. what symbols “k” were sent (events);
. what symbols “j” were received (outcomes); and
. for each “k” and “j”, how often the two corresponded.
The latter frequencies, denoted Njk, are arrayed in the “confusion matrix”. Figure 2
shows the matrix.
Note that p(k) ¼ N.k/N ¼ the probability that k was sent, and pj(k) ¼ Njk/Nj.
¼ the probability that k was sent if j was received. From those:
ES ¼ 2
j
X
k
X
pjðkÞ log pjðkÞ is the stimulus uncertainty; H ; ð3Þ
information transmitted I t ¼ I S 2 ES
¼ 2
k
X
pðkÞ log pðkÞ þ
j
X
k
X
pjðkÞ log pjðkÞ: ð4Þ
Note that IS $ I t $ ES $ 0. When transmission is perfect, It ¼ IS, the maximum It.
3. Sensory psychology: the confusion matrix of Garner and Hake (1951)
In sensory psychology, “absolute identification” experiments involving human subjects
preceded Garner and Hake (1951). The latter’s unique contribution was to reformulate
“absolute identification” so as to quantify “information transmitted” in perception, as
follows. A set of sensory stimuli are varied in one attribute, typically intensity. Shannon
“events” and “outcomes” were re-imagined as ranges called “stimulus categories” and
“response categories”. Stimulus intensity categories are represented by individual
intensities, although “Which events (or how many) are represented by which particular
discrete stimulus is an arbitrary matter” (Garner and Hake, p. 452). Stimuli evoke
Figure 2.
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sensations, that rise with intensity. Response categories correspond to non-overlapping
sensation ranges, named or numbered from low to high as “1-10” or “very mild to very
strong”, for example. In experiments, stimuli from a set representing the entire desired
intensity range are presented, in randomized order, to the subject. The subject attends to
the sensations, stating the response category that they believe is appropriate for each
stimulus. How often each stimulus is identified with a particular response category is
recorded in the confusion matrix. Figure 3 shows the matrix. To Garner and Hake
(1951, p. 452), It expresses “the amount of information about the event continuum which
a particular range of stimulus values can transmit”. For logarithms of base X in equation
(4), the number of identifiable stimulus categories is X It .
4. Problems with the Garner-Hake confusion matrix
4.1 “Noise” can be manipulated
To Shannon, “outcomes” were from the set of “events”, therefore being similar entities.
But in absolute identification, stimulus intensities are the “events”, and the responses
to them are the “outcomes” – verbal, written, or electronically indicated. Such
“outcomes” lack units, whereas stimulus intensity has units, involving mass, length
and time (rare exceptions to this exist, which deserve acknowledgment but do not
invalidate the present arguments – see Sakitt (1980), and her successors like
Georgopoulos and Massey (1988), where “outcomes” were an actual subset of “events”).
This difference in units, perhaps, motivated a classification that distracts from
differences in units – the Garner-Hake replacement of Shannon’s “events” and
“outcomes” by “categories”. Indeed, the numbers of stimulus and response categories
were usually made identical. The appropriate number was deemed to be that which
made the stimuli equally discriminable (independent of their (fixed) presentation
probabilities p(k)), because it minimized the magnitudes of off-diagonal confusion-matrix
entries and thereby improved It, whose highest empirical value thus became the only
Figure 3.
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meaningful one. Equal discriminability could be found by changing the numbers
(and hence widths) of the stimulus and response categories, through an elaborate and
time-consuming experiment mentioned in Garner and Hake (1951), which was not
always employed. Such manipulation, according to equation (4), implies altering the pj(k),
which in turn implies altering the system “noise”. But noise, to Shannon, is independent
of “events” (Figure 1). Thus, there are two significant problems here, namely, that It is
meaningless in this context unless maximized, and that the maximization itself consists
of adjusting the noise – which, to Shannon, is not adjustable. What kind of “noise”, then,
involves listener behavior?
4.2 “Noise” is memory variability, obscuring sensation variability
Discriminability depends upon comparison – which depends upon memories of the
stimuli being compared. Indeed, the “channel capacity” of absolute identification
experiments is undoubtedly short-term memory capacity (Nizami, 2010). During each
category judgment in the training sessions, the stimulus to be judged is compared to all
of the stimuli; but afterwards, only the training memories of the gamut, not immediate
memories, are available for comparison to the sensation evoked by a test stimulus.
Memory is imperfect; category judgments are therefore distributed for each magnitude
of the studied stimulus attribute, e.g. intensity (Nizami, 2011a). This point is crucial,
but is undiscernable in channel capacity “reviews” (Broadbent, 1975; Baddeley, 1994;
Shiffrin and Nosofsky, 1994), which have been narcissistic.
Some trivial algebra now intrudes. Repeating a stimulus of intensity I empirically
produces a distribution of the firing rate of voltage spikes in any of the first population
of the chain of responding sensory neurons. Firing eventually leads to sensation,
which, likewise, must be distributed, with a mean value, call it S(I), and a variance
(no symbol needed). Sensation variability is true sensory noisiness. But any one
sensation presumably evokes a distribution of category judgments, such that the
variability of categorization exceeds (and hence obscures) that of sensation
(Nizami, 2010). Figures 4 and 5 show the respective distributions.
Information transmitted (equation (4)) depends upon outcomes and events having
the same units – so that calculating It for absolute identifications depends upon
finding the outcome-as-event (i.e. the intensity) which hypothetically would have
evoked the sensation that would have evoked the recorded category judgment.
However, the I in question is unknowable precisely because categorizations and
sensations are distributed.
4.3 Transformation of outcome to mean event is impossible
Can we at least infer the “average I” corresponding to an empirical category judgment?
The first sensory neurons’ firing rates are non-linear with stimulus intensity, i.e. more
complicated than merely y ¼ ax þ b (as any contemporary review paper or textbook
will note). Therefore, S(I ) is inevitably non-linear. Let us imagine a continua of infinitely
thin categories. On average, the subject assigns a mean category, call it f, to the mean
sensation S(I ), through f(S ) – most likely non-linear, so that (on average) altogether
category (“outcome”) relates to stimulus intensity (“event”) through a non-linearity
f(S(I )) ¼ F(I ). Presumably S(I ), f(S ), and hence F(I ) are continuous, monotonic, and
smooth, hence meaningful as functions. Figure 6 shows two examples of the
transformation of I to S(I ) to f(S(I )) ¼ F(I ).
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Figure 4.
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F(I ) is typically unknown. Even if sufficient data were available to infer F(I) through
curve-fitting, it could generate the wrong I. S(I ) and f(S ) are thus indispensable. Can we
know them? S.S. Stevens of Harvard University successfully proselytized
memory-dependent self-quantifications of sensations, called magnitude estimates.
Stevens deemed them “reflexes” (Stevens, 1959), i.e. f(S ) ¼ S. S(I) was allegedly a power
function. Stevens’ claims provoked hundreds of publications over the last half-century
(worthy of separate review) which cumulatively expose magnitude estimation as a
delusion. Altogether, S(I) and f(S) are unknown – and presently unknowable.
Importantly, Figure 6 implies that with fMAX and 0, respectively, as hard upper and
lower limits on mean category judgments, the category-judgment distributions will
increasingly skew towards higher and lower categorizations, respectively, as categorization
approaches those limits. Sensation distributions will skew upwards if SMAX is taken as a
hard upper limit on mean sensation; they will skew downwards given zero as its hard lower
limit. Nizami (2011a) predicted such skewing for category judgments, but neglected it for
sensations. Skewing is seen empirically for categorizations (Nizami, 2011a).
5. Summary: how Garner and Hake (1951) fail
Garner and Hake (1951) reformulated information theory (Shannon, 1948) for “absolute
identification” experiments in sensory psychology. Their approach became an obsession,
Figure 6.
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hence begging of scrutiny. Information theory itself provides “information transmitted”
from data arrayed in the “confusion matrix”, its columns labeled by symbol sent (“event”)
and its rows labeled by symbol received (“outcome”), “outcomes” being from among the
“events”. In contrast, Garner and Hake (1951) redefined “events” and “outcomes” as
“stimulus categories” and “response categories”, arbitrarily partitioned from respective
stimulus continua and response ( ¼ stimulus categorization) continua. To meaningfully
compute information transmitted, then, categorizations must be converted to hypothetical
stimulus intensities. But the “information transmitted” in absolute identification is
redundant, in the first place, unless maximized by making the stimuli equally
discriminable. Discriminability, regardless, always depends upon comparison – which
depends upon the memories of the sensations of the stimuli being compared. Sensations are
distributed, due to neurophysiology. The category judgment from any stimulus-evoked
sensation is distributed too, because memory is imperfect. The variability of categorization
exceeds (and hence obscures) that of sensation. Altogether, the stimulus intensity evoking
any given categorization is unknowable. Even the transformations of mean categorization
to mean sensation, and mean sensation to intensity, are unknown, and presently
unknowable. In sum: absolute identifications do not lead to true “information transmitted”.
6. Insight: why Garner and Hake (1951) fail
The present paper is the fourth in a series, and should be placed in context.
The background algebras here, and some of the relevant illustrations, have been
repeated from paper to paper in order that each paper can be read independently. Each
paper proves a different point. The first of the series, Nizami (2010), showed that
absolute judgment involves numerous idiosyncracies that are not explainable within
Shannon Information Theory, but which altogether suggest that the Garner-Hake
measure of “information transmitted” and its alleged asymptote, the channel capacity,
must perforce be measures of memory capacity. However, the mechanism
whereby memory intrudes into absolute judgments was not identified. Many
estimates of memory capacity were already available from memory experiments, so it
was recommended that the Garner-Hake measure be abandoned.
But entrenched methods are hard to remove. Further agitation was deemed
necessary. Nizami (2011a) emphasized that Garner and Hake (1951) gave inconsistent
descriptions of how absolute judgments represent information transmission, and that
“channel capacity” was an artifact of sampling bias and wishful thinking. Nizami (2011a)
then qualitatively (but not quantitatively) integrated memory into absolute judgments
through a new, math-free model that predicted how absolute judgments change with the
number of judged stimuli. In particular, the model predicted that the distributions of
subjects’ absolute judgments would become systematically skewed, confirmed by
contemporary data. Altogether, then, Nizami (2010, 2011a) presented mounting evidence
that the Garner-Hake measure was merely a needlessly convoluted memory measure.
Nonetheless, that measure continues to be used (Lee et al., 2012). Such may have been
encouraged by ongoing attempts to legitimize the Garner-Hake approach by
incorporating its ideas into larger theories of perception. A sterling example is the
“entropy theory of perception” of K.H. Norwich and co-authors, dating in print from 1975.
In response, the discussion section of Nizami (2010) provided a review of earlier work
altogether revealing the entropy theory to be deeply flawed. Nonetheless, it continues to
be proselytized (Norwich, 2013). In a dedicated effort to finally unmask this false model,
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the third paper in the series was written, Nizami (2011b). 35 years worth of entropy
theory publications were painstakingly scrutinized for how they had interpreted the
basis of Shannon’s information theory, namely, Shannon’s “general communication
system”. The entropy theory’s interpretation proved to be utterly ambiguous.
Importantly, Nizami (2011b) identified a core failure of Norwich et al.’s entropy
theory: that Shannon’s “general communication system” does not compute its own
information. That is, an external observer is required, to faultlessly note the “events”,
their occurrence probabilities, and the “outcomes”. But psychologists examining
Shannon’s system, shown in his “Figure 1”, would find no observer (hence none in the
present Figure 1). The observer did eventually appear in Shannon (1948, Figure 8), as
part of a loop providing “correction data” within a “correction system”; nonetheless,
Shannon showed no realization that an observer was already required. In the
Garner-Hake measure, the perceivers are asked to quantify their own sensations, under
constraint of memory, i.e. to be self-observing. But in perception “The observer, who is
(presumed to be) the perceiver, is changed by their interaction with the stimulus.
The stimulus is ‘a difference that makes a difference’” (Nizami, 2011b, p. 1111). In
contrast, Shannon’s (hidden) observer is not changed, and only computes a statistic,
bereft of any meaning absorbed by the perceiver. Glanville (2007) had already noted that
Shannon had omitted the observer, who is necessarily “in the system and is taking part”
(Glanville, p. 388). Glanville also noted hidden Shannon assumptions, namely, that the
meaning of a message “is perfectly mapped onto” the message (Glanville, p. 377), and
that “the meaning at one end is the same as that at the other” (Glanville, p. 377), i.e. that
the recipient (at the “destination”) must have the same understanding of the possible
concepts in the message as the sender.
Here we come to the “difference that makes a difference” between the present paper
and its predecessors: neither Nizami (2010) nor Nizami (2011a) had explained precisely
how the Garner-Hake measure becomes memory-limited. The present paper fills that
gap, and also answers the crucial underlying question of why: namely, that Garner and
Hake (1951), like Norwich et al.’s entropy theory, did not meaningfully identify the
elements of the Shannon “general communication system”. In particular, the “noise” of
the Shannon system is not the “noise” of absolute identifications, an inconsistency that
ultimately arises from a larger error, namely, a failure to realize the observer’s presence
and possible actions. This brings us to a “vanishing point”, in that any point to using
Shannon information theory in sensory psychology has vanished. Correcting the
misuse of absolute identification experiments should lead to higher credibility for the
academic community in society, and may lead to increased influence over public policy.
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